

PINDAR NEMEAN 7: SOME PRELIMINARY REMARKS (vv. 1–20)

DAVID C. YOUNG

University of California, Santa Barbara

Nemean 7 played an important role in the Pindaric scholarship of antiquity, and its scholia are unusually scarred with ancient controversies. One scholiast's comment on one controversy has acquired exceptional importance in modern times: καθόλου γὰρ ἀπολογεῖσθαι βούλεται περὶ τοῦ Νεοπτολέμου θανάτου πρὸς τοὺς Αἰγινήτας. ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ ἡτιῶντο τὸν Πίνδαρον, ὅτι γράφων Δελφοῖς τὸν Παιᾶνα ἔφη ἀμφιπόλοισι μαρνάμενον μοιριᾶν περὶ τιμᾶν ἀπολωλέναι.¹ This solution to the question of Neoptolemus' relevance to Sogenes' epinician failed to convince most ancient scholars.² In the Pindaric criticism of the nineteenth century, this same view found much favor, but was still opposed by such scholars as Hermann and Tycho Mommsen.³ In 1907 Grenfell and Hunt published the considerable remains of the Delphic paean to which the scholiast refers,⁴ and Wilamowitz immediately brought forth a long article which

¹ A. B. Drachmann, ed., *Scholia vetera in Pindari carmina* (3 vols. Leipzig 1913–27) III.129. The text used here is A. Turyn, *Pindari carmina cum fragmentis*² (Oxford 1952).

² The various solutions are carefully examined by H. Fraenkel, "Schrullen in den Scholien zu Pindars Nemeen 7 und Olympien 3," *Hermes* 89 (1961) 385–97 (386–91). The above explanation is probably one of the earliest proposals, since it apparently goes back to Aristarchus; but there are considerable difficulties in ascribing the scholiasts' explanations to their proper author: besides Fraenkel's remarks on this problem see Stefan Radt, *Pindars zweiter und sechster Paian* (Amsterdam 1958) 85, note 4 and my comments thereto in my *Three Odes of Pindar* (Leiden 1968) 48, note 2.

³ Favoring: the commentaries of Dissen (*apud* Boeckh), Mezger, Fennell, Bury, Fraccaroli; opposing: Gottfried Hermann, *de Sogenis Aeginetae victoria quinquertii dissertatio* (Leipzig 1822), Tycho Mommsen, *Des Pindaros Werke in die Versmaasse des Originals uebersetzt* (Leipzig 1846) 145 f., 148.

⁴ Grenfell and Hunt, *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri* 5 (1907) 40 ff.

strongly affirmed the connection between *Nemean* 7 and the paean.⁵ The controversy seemed to be ended. In 1928 Schadewaldt used *Nemean* 7 as the basis for his important study of epinician conventions. He held fast to the notion that the poem was informed by an apology against charges arising from the paean.⁶ Yet he also argued that several passages which Wilamowitz had thought integral to the apology had nothing to do with the paean or the charges, but were straightforward parts of the epinician program.⁷

In 1961, Tugendhat carefully examined the question of the apology and the reported connection between *Nemean* 7 and *Paeon* 6.⁸ While still maintaining that the apology is fundamental to the poem, he concluded that the only explicit reference to *Paeon* 6 in *Nemean* 7 appears in the last few verses. He removed all other passages from the apologetic ledger, but regarded the apology as implicit in the choice of the myth. Since 1962, at least four Pindaric scholars, Bundy, Thummer, Ruck, and Slater, have altogether denied any connection between the epinician and the paean.⁹ With Mommsen, they would view the apology as a "kümmerliche Scholiastenerfindung." Yet other recent studies of *Nemean* 7, such as those of Bowra, Segal, and Gianotti, proceed with the apology as their very foundation, with little or no re-examination of its soundness.¹⁰

⁵ U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, "Pindars siebentes nemeisches Gedicht," *SBBerl* (1908) 328-52.

⁶ W. Schadewaldt, *Der Aufbau des Pindarischen Epinikion* (Halle 1928) 259-343.

⁷ For example, Schadewaldt (above, note 6) 320 showed that *Nem.* 7.75 f. could not refer to a poet's taking back his words in a kind of palinode (as Wilamowitz [above, note 5] 340) had thought; for *καταβέμεν* cannot mean "zurücknehmen" or "revozieren," especially combined with *χάριον* (when it refers to the paying of a debt, the image in Pindar's sentence [for which see Schadewaldt 278, etc.]).

⁸ "Zum Rechtfertigungsproblem in Pindars 7. Nemeischen Gedicht," *Hermes* 88 (1960) 385-409.

⁹ E. L. Bundy, *Studia Pindarica* (2 vols: Berkeley 1962 [=CPCP 18.1-92]) I, 4, 29, note 70, etc.; C. Ruck and W. Matheson, *Selected Odes of Pindar* (Ann Arbor 1968) 192-201 (where they carefully avoid mention of the paean); E. Thummer, *Pindar. Die Isthmischen Gedichte* I (Heidelberg 1968) 95-98; and, most recently, W. Slater, "Futures in Pindar," *CQ* N.S. 19 (1969) 86-94 (91-94). In both my "Pindaric Criticism," *Minnesota Review* 4 (1964) 584-641 (= corrected version in W. Calder III and J. Stern, ed., *Wege der Forschung* Bd. 134, *Pindaros und Bakchylides* [Darmstadt 1970] 1-95) note 126 and my *Three Odes* (above, note 2) 25, note 1, I explicitly declined to take a stand either way, for reasons which I here explain.

¹⁰ C. M. Bowra, *Pindar* (Oxford 1964) 71-74, 333 ff. and *passim*; G. F. Gianotti, "La Nemea Settima di Pindaro," *RivFC* 94 (1966) 385-406; Ch. Segal, "Pindar's Seventh Nemean," *TAPA* 98 (1967) 431-80, et al.

I do not intend to take sides nor to resolve the major controversy here; for I believe that there remain controversial so many problems of simple detail and exegesis that any firm decision on the major question would be premature. Without assuming the apology, then, I shall in this paper address myself to a few of the less spectacular disputes, in the hope of making a contribution toward the common scholarly goal, a satisfactory interpretation of the poem as a whole.

I. *Invocation of Eileithuia* (1 ff.) The ancient scholars, as Hermann Fraenkel has shown,¹¹ formally posed and disputed the question of Eileithuia's relevance to Sogenes' epinician; and our scholia record a series of opposing solutions to the difficulty. Many modern scholars accept the explanation which occurs fifth¹² and last in the series: "The comment of Aristodemus, the student of Aristarchus, is superior to these. At some point late in Thearion's life, after he had already passed the usual age and made a prayer to the goddess, Sogenes was born to him. The birth of the child came as a gift from Eileithuia, so to speak. Because of the special nature of this particular athlete's birth, then, the poet directs his words to the goddess. This view obtained acceptance because of the epigram of Simonides."¹³

Probably because Aristodemus' explanation implies biographical knowledge of remarkable detail, Fraenkel subjects it to careful scrutiny. He notes that the very same biographical details crop up in the scholiasts' explanations of other passages in the ode, where they clearly betray a misunderstanding of the text. Fraenkel suggests that the interpretation was founded on a mistaken temporal rendering of *kairos* in 58 and spread to the explanations of other passages whenever a specious relation to it could be made. Fraenkel concludes that the biographical interpretation is obviously wrong, even if Sogenes had happened, in fact, to be a late-born son.¹⁴

Fraenkel's thoughtful refutation of this ancient biographical con-

¹¹ Fraenkel (above, note 2) 391-94.

¹² For the sake of consistency, I retain the numbers which Fraenkel has assigned to the sundry explanations of the scholiast; there are, in fact, at least six solutions to the "Eileithyia-Aporie": Fraenkel does not count the first statement (*ἐνιοι μὲν κτλ.*) in the scholia, because it quickly proceeds to other matters (yet the idea that Sogenes was merely "very young" is a solution followed by many modern scholars, e.g., Wilamowitz, *Pindaros* [Berlin 1922] 161).

¹³ Drachmann (above, note 1) 116.

¹⁴ Fraenkel (above, note 2) 393.

coction probably would have persuaded the scholarly world, were it not for the Simonides epigram which Aristodemus apparently adduced as evidence. Fraenkel explicitly ignores the epigram, pleading that its loss precludes our drawing conclusions from it. Yet it is in the lost epigram, with its comforting, authentic Bergk number¹⁵ (Simonides 166) that Aristodemus' modern followers take refuge.¹⁶ Aristodemus' biographical assertions will probably not be laid to rest until the epigram is found. But, as I shall soon explain, I think that I have found it (or rather that it was never lost).

Aristodemus' interpretation probably did not arise from the misunderstanding of *kairos* in 58, but from the same general source as another of our scholiasts' solutions to the Eileithuia-difficulty.¹⁷ Here the background is linguistic rather than biographical: "Some say that Eileithuia is dragged in with reference to Sogenes' name. For she is a savior of the race, so to speak, in that she preserves what is begotten. Pindar therefore makes a frigid pun on Sogenes' name. This explanation is no good."¹⁸ We may admire our anonymous¹⁹ compiler's judgment here, yet it is he who certifies Aristodemus' comment on the late-born son, which, I suggest, is founded on a perhaps less frigid but no more likely pun. Aristodemus is distinguished among the Pindaric scholars of antiquity only for his rash and far-fetched solutions to old controversies.²⁰ When this inventive man felt compelled to

¹⁵ T. Bergk, *PLG* III⁴; N.B. the number in *PLG* III³ is 167, not 166.

¹⁶ E.g., L. R. Farnell, *The Works of Pindar* (3 vols: London 1930-32) II.290; one wonders whether Segal (above, note 10) would have written "One of the more plausible scholiasts' explanations, given on good Hellenistic authority" had he not read in Farnell "Aristodemos, one of the best of the Aristarchean school . . . quotes the authority of an epigram of Simonides for this (Bergk fr. 166)." Cf. even the choice of the word *affirmer* (rather than a verb such as *dire*) in the comment of G. Méautis, *Pindare le Dorien* (Neuchâtel 1962) 50.

¹⁷ I need not plead the possibility that more than one of these onomastic puns could be contrived by the scholiasts, for modern scholarship has come up with a third: Paul Maas (*apud* Schadewaldt [above, note 6] 297, note 2) suggested that Pindar referred to Eileithuia because he envisioned Sogenes as ὁς σῶς ἐγενήθη.

¹⁸ Drachmann (above, note 1) III.116.

¹⁹ It appears (Drachmann [above, note 1] III.116) that the compiler is Didymus, but the manner of presentation precludes absolute certainty (Fraenkel [above, note 2] 391, note 1).

²⁰ See his (second? see Fraenkel [above, note 2] 390) explanation of Neoptolemus' relevance and his comments on *Pyth.* 3.77 (Drachmann [above, note 1] III.124 and II.80, respectively); see further my *Three Odes* (above, note 2) 47 f.

offer a novel solution to the Eileithuia-difficulty, the name Sogenes apparently conjured up before him the commonplace literary image of the long-awaited son, the *desideratum* in the prayers of the man without male issue, who will save the family's line from extinction and its inheritance from second cousins or worse.²¹ This set image and the name of Eileithuia would, for Aristodemus, doubtlessly be sufficient grounds for inventing all those historical details of Sogenes' birth. But to persuade his readers our dauntless scholar adduced an epigram of Simonides—not, as modern scholars apparently think, as a historical source for the biography of Sogenes, but as a literary parallel for the kind of onomastic pun that he has just attributed to Pindar. The epigram is, I think, the familiar Simonides 168 Bergk:

Σῶσος καὶ Σωσώ, Σῶτερ, σοὶ τόνδ' ἀνέθηκαν,
Σῶσος μὲν σωθεῖς, Σωσώ δ' ὅτι Σῶσος ἐσώθη.²²

We learn nothing about Sogenes of Aegina from the Simonides epigram. Provided, then, that my reconstruction is sounder than that which I attribute to Aristodemus, the Pindar scholium should be brought into the testimonia to Simonides 168; and the hitherto lost Simonides 166 (196 Edmonds) is a non-existent phantom which should be stricken from the lists. Having set aside Simonides and the question of Thearion's age on Sogenes' natal day, we may return to Pindar.

Fraenkel himself terms correct that explanation of the scholiasts which states, "Others say that Pindar in every case praises τοὺς ἐκ φύσεως

²¹ Pindar himself provides one of the best examples in *Ol.* 10.90–94;

ἀλλ' ὥτε παῖς ἐξ ἀλόχου πατρὶ
ποθινὸς ἴκοντι νεότατος τὸ πάλιν ἤδη,
μάλα δέ τοι θερμαίνει φιλότατι νόον·
ἐπεὶ πλοῦτος ὁ λαχὼν ποιμένα
ἐπακτὸν ἀλλότριον,
θνήσκειν στυγερώτατος·

(N.B. the topic is so well-known that it is used as an image in a simile; Aristodemus had surely read this very passage); cf. Aesch. *Ch.* 505 f., Pind. *frag.* 105 Turyn (104c) 16 f., *Ol.* 9.64–67, etc. Catullus' variation (68.119 f.) shows the full theme taken one step further.

²² I make no comment on the authenticity of Simonides 168 Bergk⁴ (which is 109 Edmonds, 161 Diehl, and [N.B.] 165 Bergk³) nor on Bergk's emendation printed in all three texts and above.

ἀγαθούς more than τῶν ἐκ διδασκαλίας. It was Eileithuia, then, who rendered Sogenes adept at athletics to begin with.”²³ This view is at least partially correct, in that the birth-goddess, “colleague of the Fates,” as we might translate Pindar’s *πάρεδρε Μοιρᾶν* in 1, may readily be associated with the excellence necessary for athletic achievement—which is, indeed, for Pindar literally innate.²⁴ So we find *σὺν τίν* in 6, “with your help.”²⁵ But the difference between innate and acquired excellence hardly seems relevant to the proem of *Nemean* 7. Moreover, Fraenkel is technically correct in asserting that we should not even pose the scholiasts’ question, “Why is Eileithuia introduced into an epinician for Sogenes, and not in the poems for other youths?”; for the connection between Eileithuia and Sogenes’ success is a general one, not applicable to him only. Nevertheless, we are not excused from asking why *Nemean* 7, and no other Pindaric poem, begins with an invocation to Eileithuia. In other words, our responsibility is to see how the proem of *Nemean* 7 functions in its own distinctive literary context.

Ἐλείθνια, πάρεδρε Μοιρᾶν βαθυφρόνων,
 παῖ μεγαλοσθενέος, ἄκουσον, Ἥρας, γενέτειρα τέκνων· ἄνευ σέθεν
 οὐ φάος, οὐ μέλαιναν δρακέντες εὐφρόναν
 τεὰν ἀδελφεὰν ἐλάχομεν ἀγλαόγνιον Ἥβαν.
 ἀναπνέομεν δ’ οὐχ ἅπαντες ἐπὶ ἴσα·
 εὔργει δὲ πότμῳ ζυγένηθ’ ἕτερον ἕτερα. σὺν δὲ τίν
 καὶ παῖς ὁ Θεαρίωνος ἀρετᾷ κριθεῖς
 εὐδοξος αἰεῖται Σωγένης μετὰ πενταέθλοις.

It is obvious that the passage does not deal exclusively with Sogenes, for it emphasizes the universal importance of Eileithuia; she is responsible for the life of every human being. But the destinies that accom-

²³ Fraenkel (above, note 2) 393; scholium: Drachmann (above, note 1) III 117.

²⁴ Tugendhat (above, note 8) writes an important note (p. 407, note 2) on *φνύα*; my own reflections are in parentheses. Pindaric scholars are accustomed to speak of *phua* in Pindar as if it were a (positive) quality (almost a substance) in itself, *der Phua*; yet all five pertinent occurrences of the word in Pindar, i.e., where it means *natura* as opposed to *statura*, occur in the dative; and the word functions more as an adverb than a substantive (“birth-wise,” “at” or “through” birth—the concept has much to do with our notion of innate instincts, as *Nem.* 1.25 suggests, and very little to do with our concept of noble blood): “Phua ist also für Pindar nicht ein Etwas, sondern ein Wie.”

²⁵ Cf. *ἐν τίν* later in this poem (90), for which see W. Slater, *Lexicon Pindaricum* (Berlin 1969) 174 (s.v. *ἐν* 10).

pany each of us from birth are not the same. So, within the common background provided by Eileithuia, Sogenes is distinguished (*κριθείς*) by his athletic success.

The passage has much in common with a familiar Pindaric type, in which the poet emphasizes some universal fact of human existence only to contrast the distinguished and distinctive position of his patron within the universal limit of human experience.²⁶ So reminders of the universality of misfortune or the spatial limits of human endeavor are almost always accompanied by a contrasting statement of the unusual extent of the patron's good fortune or achievement, respectively.²⁷

Even more to the point are similar passages which insist on universal death, such as *Nemean* 11.11–16 and *Isthmian* 7.42 f.: "We all die alike. But our *daimones* are unequal."²⁸ That brief comment, despite the difference between birth and death, bears obvious formal affinities to *Nemean* 7.1–5. And Pindar's two most explicit expressions of the universality of death occur later in the very passage that is introduced by the Eileithuia-invocation to *Nemean* 7; namely, *Nemean* 7.19 f. ("Rich and poor alike go to the limit of death") and *Nemean* 7.30 f. ("The wave of Hades comes to everyone; it falls alike on those who are esteemed²⁹ and those who are not"). The appearance of such strong statements, first of the universality of birth, then of death, in the same passage seems significant; I suggest that the first part of *Nemean* 7 concerns itself, in part, with the common experience and universal limits of human life specifically—as we might put it—"from

²⁶ Most of these passages are ably discussed by Bundy (above, note 9) *passim*, and Thummer (above, note 9) 67–81 (summary: 77–80); cf. my *Three Odes* (above, note 9) index, s.v. "human limitations." For a mere (but unencumbered) list of the pertinent passages in their categories see my *Pindar Isthmian 7, Myth, and Exempla* (Leiden 1971) 29, note 94.

²⁷ *Nemean* 7 itself offers a good example for the former category in verses 55–60; for the latter, *Isthm.* 4.9–13 may serve as a model. Humanity itself may be the limiting term (*Isthm.* 5.15–20).

²⁸ For the relationship of *Isthm.* 7.42 f. to these other passages (its point is at least partly encomiastic) see Thummer (above, note 9) 117 (and his remarks on "*ne plus ultra*") and the discussion of the question in my *Pindar Isthmian 7* (above, note 26) 28 f. with notes.

²⁹ The scholiasts (Drachmann [above, note 1] III.122) and modern scholars (e.g., D. Gerber, "Pindar *Nemean* 7, 31," *AJP* 84 [1963] 182–88; Thummer [above, note 9] 96) alike dispute whether Pindar means "those who are esteemed and those who are not" or "those who expect it and those who do not." The reasons for my choice will be given in another paper (*CSCA* 4[1971]).

the cradle to the grave.” Against the background of this universal subject, Pindar focuses on a particular man, Sogenes of Aegina, and on some events within the life of the man which serve to differentiate him (7) from the others with whom he necessarily shares the common human experience from birth to death. These distinguishing events are Sogenes’ athletic victory (8) and its celebration (8–10) in the poet’s immortalizing song (11–16).

The skeleton of Pindar’s argument in *Nemean* 7.1–8, then, is a lifeless, almost ridiculously banal thought if paraphrased, summarized, and divorced from its context: “Of the many men who are born, few are those who, like Sogenes, win a major pentathlon contest.” But in its expression and context, Pindar’s version has blood, flesh, and heartbeat. The passage reveals this poet’s unusual ability to develop new and striking implications from seemingly banal facts of human existence or from a hackneyed expression. For I doubt that many poets besides Pindar would take a trite idea such as “We all must die,” turn it upside down, and open a serious poem with “We all must be born.”³⁰

II. *σοφοὶ δὲ μέλλοντα κτλ.* (17 f.) Verses 1–20, then, contain a coherent poetic expression and are intelligible without our supplying questionable biographical data about either Sogenes or Pindar.³¹ The only possible exception occurs at verses 17 f., where many scholars think that Pindar refers to his own difficulty resulting from the Sixth Paean. Since this sentence is controversial and much misconstrued, even by those who deny any reference to the paean, it requires especial attention. The fundamental question is whether *sophoi* refers to poets or to patrons.

There seems to have been no controversy similar to ours in antiquity; the scholia speak of patrons who are willing to spend money in order

³⁰ Although the logic is different, the form, imagination, and poetic force of the Eileithuia-proem bear noteworthy resemblance to *Isthm.* 5.1–12, where Pindar transforms the rather obscure goddess Theia, mother of the Sun (without whom we could not discern anything at all) into a powerful goddess of especial brilliance (such as that of gold or winning athletes)—and thus a goddess of distinctions (*κρίνεται* verse 12).

³¹ So John Finley, *Pindar and Aeschylus* (Cambridge Mass. 1955), “So far [23] Pindar has traveled a familiar route, though with singular freshness and serenity: that the golden moment arises, to vanish except for poetry, which holds its timelessness” (pp. 100 f.). Finley cleverly avoids the difficulty to which I now turn; he simply chooses both sides of the controversy (100).

to acquire future fame.³² This ancient view makes excellent sense in the context. The idea that *sophoi* here connotes poets appears in Fennell's commentary, and was canonized by Wilamowitz, who thought that ὑπὸ κέρδει βλάβεν referred to false (poetic) prophecy.³³ In 1928, Schadewaldt argued strongly that *sophoi* referred to poets, and that the sentence was a reply to the accusations of the Aeginetans that the Theban poet had mistreated Neoptolemus in the paean—perhaps for money (*hypo kerdei*).³⁴

Although Schadewaldt himself dutifully (but rather triumphantly³⁵) noted that his own interpretation made no sense in its context, he blamed the inconsistency on Pindar rather than on the interpretation. Fraenkel, maintaining that *sophoi* meant wise patrons rather than poets, vigorously opposed the new interpretation in his review of Schadewaldt's book.³⁶ Nevertheless, virtually all Pindaric scholars since Schadewaldt have construed *sophoi* as poets,³⁷ and, in the last careful examination of this question, Douglas Gerber upheld Schadewaldt, finding inadequate the parallels with which Fraenkel had supported

³² Drachmann (above, note 1) III.120; but some scholiasts wrongly emphasized Pindar's *philokerdeia*: see below, note 41.

³³ C. M. A. Fennell, *Pindar: Nemean and Isthmian Odes*² (Cambridge 1899) 85; Wilamowitz (above, note 12) 161 f. (cf. *SBBerl* 1908 [above, note 5] 334).

³⁴ Schadewaldt (above, note 6) 300. Since Wilamowitz treats the matter rather obscurely, Schadewaldt's usual candidness is welcome: "Der Satz antwortet also bereits auf die Vorwürfe der Aegineten, Pindar habe aus Liebedienerei gegen die Delpher, vielleicht gar wegen des Geldes Apollon den Neoptolemos im Paian strafen lassen."

³⁵ "Der folgende Gedanke steht in keiner erkennbaren Beziehung zu dem Satz über die Dichter." His denial of any thematic connection between verses 18 and 19 affords Schadewaldt an opportunity to discuss a "Stilistische Tatsache" of the supposedly prelogical (p. 307) Pindar, namely, word-association without thematic coherence (pp. 300 ff.).

³⁶ *Gnomon* 6 (1930) 1–20 (11 f.) = H. Fraenkel, *Wege und Formen frühgriechischen Denkens*² (Munich 1960) 360.

³⁷ It is perhaps natural that those who believe in the apology should choose Schadewaldt's view over Fraenkel's (Segal [above, note 10] 442, et al.), but surprising to find the opponents of the apology now supporting, against Fraenkel, an interpretation which developed in support of the apology: so Thummer (above, note 9) 95, note 77, Ruck and Matheson (above, note 9) 195, and Slater (above, note 25) 468 (?: Slater lists the passage under σοφοί a. (general) rather than b. (poets), but he refers the user to Schadewaldt only). Tugendhat (above, note 8) 401, note 5 and (apparently) Bundy (above, note 9) 87 f. are, to my knowledge, the only scholars to follow Fraenkel and the old interpretation in the last 35 years. Gianotti (above, note 10) interprets *sophoi* to mean "poets" and then develops an idiosyncratic interpretation which apparently requires us to view *sophoi* as pejorative, the last three words as a kind of indirect discourse, and *kerdos* as a word connoting fame.

his objections. Yet Gerber's decision in favor of Schadewaldt was influenced by the then uncontroversial notion that *Nemean* 7 contains an apology for the paean, a conclusion which a serious re-examination of the poem must not presuppose.³⁸ Moreover, Fraenkel did not adduce the best available parallels.³⁹ I think that the matter is resolved by Theocritus, who cannot be regarded a poor interpreter of Pindaric discourse.

Throughout *Idyll* 16, written to secure the patronage of Hieron II, Theocritus bemoans the fact that the men of his day are not willing to spend money on a poet who will immortalize their deeds. Verses 14 f. summarize his general theme:

οὐ γὰρ ἔτ' ἄνδρες ἐπ' ἔργμασιν ὡς πάρος ἐσθλοῖς
αἰνεῖσθαι σπεύδοντι, νενίκηγται δ' ὑπὸ κερδέων.

In verses 58 f. Theocritus reminds Hieron (and us) that fame comes through poetry, and once a man is dead, the living will waste his money anyway:

Ἐκ Μοισᾶν ἀγαθὸν κλέος ἔρχεται ἀνθρώποισι,
χρήματα δὲ ζῶντες ἀμαλδύνουσι θανόντων.

Yet, Theocritus reflects, it is useless labor (60 ff.) to try to convince a man of these facts, if the man is spoiled by a love of money (63):

ἀλλ' ἴσος γὰρ ὁ μόχθος ἐπ' ᾧ κύματα μετρεῖν

(two more useless labors follow)

καὶ φιλοκερδεῖα βεβλαμμένον ἄνδρα παρελθεῖν.

³⁸ Gerber (above, note 29) 183–85. "The question now arises, what is this disaster? It is surely the disaster which can arise if one's poetry is misunderstood, and it is the misunderstanding on the part of the Aeginetans of the myth of Neoptolemus in the Sixth Paean which caused Pindar to write the Seventh Nemean," p. 184. This is a reasonable conclusion if we presuppose the apology (as everyone did, when Gerber wrote—so A. Puech, *Pindare, Néméennes*³ (Paris 1958) 87 had written [first in 1923] "Aujourd'hui, le problème le plus délicat est définitivement résolu. Il reste des obscurités de détail"). But if we do not assume the apology, Gerber's difficult question leads us back to Fraenkel's explanation.

³⁹ I am concerned with providing a better parallel for the general topic than the barely adequate *Pyth.* 1.90 ff. I am not supporting Fraenkel's "Ruhmwind," the parallels for which Gerber (above, note 29) 184 correctly rejects. However, Gerber's belief that the wind must imply disaster is also beside the mark; the main connotation of *tritaios anemos* is simply "the future," which, like a wind, can be either good or bad. In its context, however, the phrase probably implies eventual death—as a fact of life, not a disaster.

The linguistic affinities of *νενίκηγνται ὑπὸ κερδέων* (15) and *φιλοκερδεία βεβλαμμένον* (63) to Pindar’s *ὑπὸ κέρδει βλάβεν* in *Nemean* 7.18 are obvious, as is the common contextual topic, the necessity of song for the preservation of noble deeds. Both Pindar (*ἄφνεός κτλ.* *Nem.* 7.19) and Theocritus point out that the rich man will eventually die, a clear argument against the hoarding of wealth. Moreover, there is a good parallel to Pindar’s *sophoi* in another portion of Idyll 16, where the theme is once more the same (*φρονέουσιν* 23). And both Theocritus (16.57) and Pindar (*Nem.* 7.21) cite Homer’s example as proof of the powers of poetry.

The connection between *Nemean* 7.18 and Theocritus 16.15 and 63 has apparently escaped the notice of Pindaric scholars. But Gow concludes his note on Idyll 16.23 with the matter-of-fact comment, ‘‘T(hocritus) is thinking of Pind. *N.* 7.18 οὐδ’ ὑπὸ κέρδει βλάβεν, where the theme is the same.’’⁴⁰ Even were we to disagree, not being certain that Theocritus consciously recalled *Nemean* 7, I do not see how we could attach unrelated meanings to almost identical phrases when they appear in almost identical contexts. I therefore agree with Gow that ‘‘the theme is the same.’’⁴¹

⁴⁰ A. S. F. Gow, *Theocritus*² (2 vols: Cambridge 1950; reprint 1965) II.318.

⁴¹ The scholiasts *ad Nem.* 7.17 emphasize Pindar’s personal *philokerdeia*; F. Mezger, *Pindars Siegeslieder* (Leipzig 1880) 365 f. interprets the recommendation for liberality as so general that there is no thought of poets. Both views are equally wrong; see my *Three Odes* (above, note 9) 61, note 1 and cf. Theocritus 16.25–30, which commends all good deeds (kindness to relatives, others, gods, and *xenoi*) but especially (*malista*, verse 29) favor to poets, who will celebrate the other *erga* and thus confer poetic immortality after physical death (verse 30). For athletic victory itself as *euergesia* see Schadewaldt (above, note 6) 278 with note 2. With Theocritus 16.23 f. cf. Pind. *Py.* 8.94–96 (90–92 Snell and Bowra).